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question Honneth himself tries hard to answer in the above-mentioned new 
postscript. Sartre can simply point to the Hegelian insight that the individual who 
has experienced objectification will struggle to recover her status as a subject by in 
turn objectifying the other. Consequently, and unlike Honneth, Sartre understands 
social order as inherently conflictual, making it hard to imagine a stabilized and 
harmonious arrangement of mutual recognition that is not continually challenged 
and transformed (pp. 104-105). 
 The relationship between recognition and autonomy, then, does not seem as self-
evident as Honneth at times suggests. If Sartre’s phenomenological analysis of the 
negativity and asymmetry of identificatory and objectifying processes of recognition 
is at all plausible, it strongly tells against recognition being based on a non-distort-
ing perception of—or adequate response to—qualities of persons and unambiguously 
ensuring individual autonomy. On the other hand, it is not clear how the justification 
of (moral) claims to recognition has to be understood: is it a matter of (evaluative)
perception, which is supposed to provide the moral agent with reasons directly, or 
rather a matter of argument with and justification to relevant others? As seems to 
be the case with the struggle for recognition, then, the theory of recognition is not 
about to come to a standstill. In particular the relations between the cognitive and 
the normative dimensions of recognition and between its freedom-enhancing and its 
conformity-imposing effects clearly need more discussion—a discussion Honneth 
fortunately seems ready to carry on. 
Robin Celikates 
Max-Weber-Kolleg, Erfurt, Germany 
celikates@web.de 
Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other, translated from the French by Nidra 
Poller, with an introduction by Richard A. Cohen (Urbana and Chicago: University 
of Illinois Press, 2003), 131 pp. ISBN 0252 028406 (hbk). Hardback/Paperback. 
$29.95/$–. 
Emmanuel Levinas has been emerging as the most important voice in moral theory 
in Continental Europe in the twentieth century. While no satisfactory grasp of his 
thought can be gained without studying his two masterworks, Totality and Infinity
and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, there are many glimpses of his radical 
approach to ethics in the many essays and smaller books that he published in his 
lifetime. 
 The three essays by Levinas that make up the bulk of this text were published 
separately in France between 1964 and 1970 and then gathered together by him 
into a book with a new foreword in 1972. They have been previously published in 
English in a collection of articles by Levinas, translated and edited by Alphonso 
Lingis: Emmanuel Levinas: Collected Philosophical Papers (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1987) and the most substantial of these essays was also reprinted in a revised version 
of Lingis’s translation, with copious footnotes, in Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon 
Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (eds.), Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 33-64. However, in his 
introduction to the present volume, Richard A. Cohen explicates some of the subtle 
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differences that the two translations evince. For her part, the translator acknowl-
edges the inevitable reshaping that any translation brings to the thought of so intri-
cate a writer as Levinas. There may well be value, then, in having a new rendering of 
these texts and in a form more akin to the original French publication.  
 Of considerable value in the introduction is the situating of Levinas’s thought  
in the context of a debate within European thought between humanism and anti-
humanism. This debate was crystallized in an exchange in Davos in 1929 between 
Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger at which Levinas was present (and in which he 
was to play a minor role critical of Cassirer which he was later to regret). The dispute 
between the two great German thinkers was ostensibly over their respective interpre-
tations of Kant. Cassirer took the more traditional view of Kant as having theorized 
the creative role of human intellect in the production of knowledge and of culture 
so as to empower reason in its enlightenment role. Heidegger, in contrast, appropri-
ated Kant’s thought to highlight the role of imagination. Insofar as man is situated 
and ‘thrown’ into a worldly and historical existence, his productive imagination is 
an expression of his context with the role of reason demoted to that of editor, as it 
were, of the resultant finite understandings on the part of Dasein. With these differ-
ing conceptions of reason and of human freedom, the lines were drawn between an 
enlightenment humanism that accords humanity freedom and a critical reflexivity 
that can attain to truth and a conception of justice on the one hand, and an anti-
humanism that, in Heidegger’s version, sees humanity as the fated expression of the 
self-disclosure of Being and the ‘guardian’ of what history makes inevitable on the
other. While Levinas’s sympathies in this debate came to lean more towards Cassirer, 
recent scholarship has aligned him with Heidegger. Nothing could be further from a 
true appreciation of both thinkers.  
 There would seem to be two dialectical nodes to the first of Levinas’s three 
essays, ‘Significance and Sense’. The first of these is the structuralist conception of 
subjectivity that would see it as the product of culture and of discourse. The so-
called ‘death of the subject’ is an anti-humanism in which social and historical 
forces are posited as having a more formative role in human existence and in the 
values we live by than does originary and creative human subjectivity. The second 
dialectical node is relativism. It would follow from the ‘death of the subject’ 
position that, without a basis in a subjectivity that was somehow ‘independent’, 
there is no place from which a moral critique of culture could be offered. If such a 
critique were proferred from outside of that culture it would be an expression of 
cultural imperialism and if it were proferred from within that culture it would lack a 
basis transcending the norms of that culture and so fail to have any critical edge.  
 Levinas seeks to refute the ‘death of the subject’ view and the relativism that 
comes in its wake by reaffirming the active and creative nature of subjectivity. He 
does so by suggesting that the meaning or signification that the world has for subjects
always goes beyond what is given in perception. Meaning is the product of a 
hermeneutic process that not only interprets reality as being more meaningful than 
the merely given, but also creates the context or ‘totality’ within which this interpre-
tation can be grounded. Subjectivity, therefore, is both creative and necessary to 
there being a meaningful world. But lest this argument be thought to lead to an 
idealist, voluntarist, or Nietzschean conception of subjectivity as will-to-power, 
Levinas argues that the ground for this creative and meaning-making role for sub-
jectivity is not the Ego, but the Other. It is by responding to the ethical demand 
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placed upon subjectivity by the nakedness, vulnerability and absoluteness of the 
Other, that the self comes to itself. It is not the reflexivity of consciousness that 
establishes subjectivity but the call that the Other places upon one.  
 In this way, Levinas has established both the active, creative and essential nature 
of subjectivity for the meaningfulness of the world, and also its ethical and rela-
tional nature. It is this latter which then becomes the basis for his attack on relativ-
ism. Levinas grants that a Platonism or moral realism which sees the intelligible as
existing beyond the world is untenable. However, a conception of values as immanent
to cultures need not preclude the possibility of subjectivity taking a critical stance 
towards its own culture and towards the cultures of others. Its ethical nature as a
response to the call of the Other gives it a basis of critique. Subjectivity has a ‘sense’. 
It has a direction and movement towards the Other. It is on the basis of this pri-
mordial direction or sense that the significances and norms posited by historical 
cultures can be criticized.  
 Levinas’s discussion of the face of the Other in its seventh section of the essay is 
as clear and succinct a statement of the core of his ethics as one is likely to find. 
The essay also contains suggestive excursions into the epistemological and onto-
logical difficulties raised by positing the face of the Other as a being beyond being 
and by displacing subjectivity from the epistemological centrality which traditional 
philosophy has given it.  
 In the essay, ‘Humanism and An-Archy’, Levinas returns to his attack on the 
anti-humanists and to his positing of a core of subjectivity that escapes their 
totalizing theories. Here he speaks of subjectivity as ‘pre-originary’ and in that sense 
‘an-archic’ (p. 51). It is expression and creativity. It is a ‘responsibility prior to 
freedom’ (p. 52). But this may lead one to think that this responsibility is fate and 
is not accepted voluntarily. Are we enslaved to the Other? Such a conception, 
answers Levinas, would presuppose an ontological distinction between subjectivity 
and that which would enslave it. But it is precisely this distinction which does not 
obtain at this primordial level. The subject does not pre-exist the responsibility that 
it is called to by the Other. It is called into being by this responsibility, and so it is 
not enslaved by it.  
 In the third and final essay, ‘Without Identity’, Levinas extends his critique of the 
contemporary thesis of the death of subjectivity and the social construction of iden-
tity to Heidegger’s contribution to that position. For Heidegger, it is not humanity 
that speaks and acts, but it is Being which speaks and acts through humanity. It is 
the task of human beings merely to tend to the voice of Being and, through art, 
knowledge and culture, bring it to expression. Humanity is, as it were, a vehicle for 
the being of Being. Heidegger rejects any primordial interiority which belongs to 
humanity as such. Against these attacks on humanism and on interiority, Levinas 
posits the vulnerability of the subject. Against all the ego philosophies from Plato to 
Nietzsche, which posit the subject as epistemological or ontological centre, Levinas 
stresses its vulnerability to the Other and to the suffering of the Other. It is on this 
that our interiority, and thus identity, is based.  
 Levinas’s prose is deeply imbued with references to the Western philosophical 
tradition and he addresses an audience similarly imbued. Rather than clarification 
and carefully signposted argument, we have hyperbolic prose that provides what 
Richard Rorty has called ‘edification’ rather than demonstration. While the text is 
somewhat removed from the style and substance of ethical debates in the Anglo-
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American tradition, there is much that can be learnt from exploring Levinas’s ideas.
These essays are not a definitive or comprehensive explication of those ideas, but they 
are a relatively accessible introduction. For scholars already familiar with Levinas’s
work they disclose interesting aspects of his engagement with the philosophical 
climate of his time and for any philosopher interested in ethics Levinas’s placing of 
ethics at the very heart of epistemology and metaphysics cannot but be inspirational.
Stan van Hooft 
Deakin University, Australia 
stanvh@deakin.edu.au 
David William Archard, Children, Family and the State (Aldershot: Ashgate Publish-
ing, 2003). xiii + 190 pp. ISBN 0754605558 (pbk). Hardback/Paperback. £40.00/ 
£15.99. 
This book belongs to a series, Live Questions in Ethics and Moral Philosophy, 
offering ‘short, accessible studies addressing some of the most topical questions 
shared by moral philosophy and the social sciences’. It has three long chapters, 
respectively on ‘Children’, ‘The Family’ and ‘The State’.
 The first chapter is mainly about whether children may be said to have rights. It 
begins with a discussion of theories of rights which leaves unclear Archard’s view on 
two related questions: does every ‘perfect’ moral duty (duty to a specific person or 
to all) correlate with a moral right, as is sometimes maintained? And is a moral right 
something which by definition ought to have a corresponding positive right, actually 
enforced in law? Archard speaks of moral rights as enforceable (e.g. on pp. 4-5); I 
assume this means that they all ought to be backed by positive rights. This assumed 
correlation of moral and positive rights presumably explains why he usually writes 
simply of ‘rights’, without qualification as moral or legal, and why he sometimes asks 
whether children or parents do have a certain right, at other times (without apparent 
change of sense) whether they should. But the correlation should be made explicit.  
 The chapter contains detailed discussion of three possible positions on whether 
children have rights: roughly speaking, that children have no rights, that children 
have the same rights that adults have and that children have some rights (perhaps 
including some which adults do not have) but not all those which adults are thought 
to have. I found much of this chapter rather unsatisfactory. The discussion of the 
first position is in part about an important paper by Onora O’Neill; in this she 
argues, not that children have no rights, but that instead we should stress adults’ 
obligations to children, which consist in part of imperfect obligations which do not 
correspond to rights. Archard’s account of this difficult paper is very obscure, partly 
because of his lack of clarity about the relation between positive and moral rights. 
 Archard links O’Neill with critics of children’s rights who think that too much 
stress on rights may undermine the love and care which are children’s best safe-
guard. But he does not point out that this is not an argument against children’s 
having rights: a champion of children’s rights would say that we appeal to rights 
when love and care are lacking—or seriously misguided, as when a loving parent 
wishes to deny a daughter education. Archard does mention (pp. 10, 16) a claim 
that children do not need the protection of rights, but does not explain how this 


